

APOLa's  
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAM  
IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

[Based on an Original Proposal  
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## Introduction

As a psychoanalytic society, APOLa [*Apertura para Otro Lacan*] aims to articulate, develop, and disseminate the fundamental concepts of Jacques Lacan's new psychoanalysis. The project will be carried out in the form of a *Scientific Program in Psychoanalysis* grounded in the following premises.

## Premises

1. (a) We think of psychoanalysis as a theory animated by a scientific spirit and organized around specific epistemological principles. (b) It is a theory configured by mutually articulated and rationally argued concepts, none of them susceptible to being valued in isolation from the others. The theory's principles are axiomatic, i.e., there are initial conditions that function as postulates.
2. We choose questioning and logical reasoning as the necessary tools to build the specific knowledge that is constitutive of our practice. We do not admit dogmatic or *ad-hominem* arguments (i.e., arguments grounded in the prestige and/or authority of the person holding them). On the contrary, we practice the constant critique of our own arguments as well as the arguments of others.
3. We think that theoretical elaboration is fundamental to building knowledge. The concepts we work with do not emerge from reality, but from systems of ideas that are never the mere outcome of experience, but the result of a conceptual elaboration constituting a field of knowledge and making possible an experiential domain.
4. We think that Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory is different from, and in many instances, the opposite of, the theories of Sigmund Freud and all the other schools of psychoanalysis. Thus, our aim is to preserve and develop what is, in our view, the most novel and subversive aspects of Lacan's teaching.
5. Following Lacan's teaching and our own conviction, we think of psychoanalysis as an "inter-territorial field" and, consequently, we practice it as a discipline that we conceive as being intimately articulated with other neighboring disciplines, such as mathematics, logic, physics, discourse analysis, linguistics, anthropology, and history, among others.

## The Society's Principles

The participants of this call consider APOLa's *Scientific Research Program in Psychoanalysis* as an alternative to the prevailing psychoanalytic model, according to which an individual master, on the basis of their accumulated personal experience, imparts their knowledge to a group of disciples. Our opposition to this model lies in our conviction that research—not reading—happens collectively and must be carried out by multiple researchers—who may otherwise well have their own research projects, personal interests, and academic backgrounds—adhering to the Program.

Neither Freud nor Lacan were individual “geniuses” that created their psychoanalytic theories out of nothing. By proposing this Program to the community, we aim to:

- A) Elaborate and criticize concepts and ideas and interrogate the concrete ways in which they operate in our practices. Naturally, tackling this task in a shared workspace does not entail widespread agreement on all the topics discussed.
- B) Develop or expand on the consequences of taking on a set of basic principles to apply them to the researchers’ own areas, disciplines, or research projects.
- C) Found new ways of thinking and conceiving fundamental questions in our practices. In so doing we aim to rationally oppose in specific ways other current theories and practices.

## Epistemological Principles

Our epistemology holds that scientific theories emerge out of prior bodies of knowledge, overcoming them in virtue of their stronger coherence and strength, which is consensually established by the scientific community and, when possible, through experimental verifications and practical applications.

Scientific theories do not arise out of experience: they always emerge from prior theories. Further, only once they have been formulated and communicated, can they be, at most, *partially* confirmed or refuted through criticism, tests, and experiments.

We do not reject the idea that there is a constant back-and-forth between theory and experimentation, but we do reject the notion that psychoanalysis, as all the other sciences, emerges out of experience and that the latter is based, in turn, on personal lived-experiences. Modern science formally begins when what is revealed to us by our senses is subjected to methodical doubt.

## Structure of Scientific Theories

Following Imre Lákatos, we think that scientific theories are structures constituted by:

### 1) A Kernel

This is the conceptual structure constituted by the smallest number of basic presuppositions—general theoretical hypothesis—established in virtue of a methodological decision made by the participants. The kernel has the following features:

- a) It is falsifiable: in words of Karl Popper, “[S]tatements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations.”;<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York/London: Basic Books, 1962), p.39. In his *Tercer Seminario Internacional “Avances en Psicoanálisis”* (available on [www.eidelszteinalfredo.com.ar](http://www.eidelszteinalfredo.com.ar)), Alfredo Eidelsztein examined the popular belief that psychoanalysis is not a science. He holds that this belief is to a great extent a consequence of a widespread misunderstanding (in which Lacan also participates) of Popper’s stance. In this regard, a key passage by Popper examined by Eidelsztein in his seminar is the following: “In order not to repeat myself too often, I did not mention in this lecture my suggestion for

- b) It is conventional;
- c) Its components are posited as axioms;
- d) It does not proceed from empirical facts.

“Popper proposed that for arguments to be scientific they must be formulated in such a way that a certain logic is applicable to them, i.e., that they admit of contradictions or that it is conceivable that there is a case that refutes them. If we claim that ‘all swans are white’ there is no need to actually see a black swan for the formula to be refutable: we already know that it is in virtue of its very logic, as it would be enough for us to see a non-white swan. Popper adds, ‘in fact the same [logic] is applicable to my own arguments, as I have presented an argument that is not empirically contrastable.’ Indeed, Popper’s theory is not empirically contrastable: in what laboratory, using what kind of microscope, could one verify that what Popper claims can be subjected to criticism? He writes, ‘I have even been criticized from the very first day I published [my 1932 book, *Conjectures and Refutations*]. What shows that my argument is Popperian is the fact that it is susceptible of being criticized.’ The problem arises when an argument is not susceptible of being criticized, when it is expressed in the form, ‘if the patient agrees with Freud, then Freud is right because the patient is claiming so; if the patient disagrees, Freud is still right because, in disagreeing, the patient is resisting. Thus, Freud is always right. So expressed, the argument is not scientific because its logic does not allow a criticism that proves it wrong.”<sup>2</sup>

The kernel of our Program is designated as “Fundamental Concepts.”

## 2) A Protecting Belt

This is the set of auxiliary hypotheses configuring the supplementary assumptions. Their primordial function is to rationally sustain the Program’s fundamental concepts. This set we designate as “Articulated Concepts.”

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a criterion of the empirical character of a theory (falsifiability or refutability as the criterion of demarcation between empirical theories and non-empirical theories). Since in English ‘science’ means ‘empirical science,’ and since the matter is sufficiently fully discussed in my books, I have written things like the following (for example, in *Conjectures and Refutations*, p.39): ‘[I]n order to be ranked as scientific, [statements] must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations.’ Some people seized upon this like a shot (as early as 1932, I think). ‘What about your own gospel?’ is the typical move (I found this objection again in a book published in 1973). My answer to the objection, however, was published in 1934 (see my *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, chapter 2, section 10 and elsewhere). I may restate my answer: my gospel is not ‘scientific,’ i.e., it does not belong to empirical science, but it is, rather, a (normative) *proposal*. My gospel (and also my answer) is, incidentally, criticizable, though not just by observation—and it has been criticized. (Popper, Karl, *The Myth of the Framework. In Defense of Science and Rationality* [London & New York: Routledge], p.29.)

<sup>2</sup> Eidelsztein, Alfredo, Tercer Seminario Internacional: “Avances en psicoanálisis.” Available on [www.eidelszteinalfredo.com.ar](http://www.eidelszteinalfredo.com.ar), pp.10-11.

# Program of Scientific Research in Psychoanalysis

Our Program aims to:

- a) Contribute to the development of the arguments of the “psychoanalysis-to-come” promoted by us;
- b) Overcome the aporias of the current Freud-Lacanian movement; and
- c) Reduce the decades-long isolation of psychoanalysis from the scientific community, which has left it formidably behind in relation to the development of the sciences.

Here below we present the basic assumptions (the general theoretical hypotheses) that, as a result of a methodological decision, we have established as the conceptual kernel of our Program.

Contrary to Freud and Lacan, who, respectively, posited the “Ego, Super-Ego, and *Id*” and the “Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real” triads, we think of the point of departure of psychoanalysis from a different logic: first, one must diagnose the problem and only then try to find solutions for it.

Thus, the table below presents our cultural, social, and epochal diagnosis of the origins of human suffering, as it is on this suffering that psychoanalysis must intervene. Then, we move to describe our response to the prevailing position in psychoanalysis today, one that is prevalent among post-Lacanian psychoanalysts. Finally, we introduce our stance and a possible algebraic formulation thereof.

We maintain, then, that the hegemonic positions in post-Lacanian psychoanalysis coincide, to a great extent, with the orientation of the ideas in our society that generate those contemporary forms of suffering to be treated by the psychoanalytic clinic.

A Diagnosis of the Tendencies that Operate as the Origin of the Suffering Treated by Psychoanalysis	
1. Individualism	The atomic conception of the subject is taken to an extreme: each individual is like a sphere in a society that is conceived, in turn, as a sum of individuals (1+1+1...). These spheres are thought of as billiard balls.
2. Biologism	The most real and authentic in each of us is our biological body and all that comes from it.
3. Sexualization of Identity	One’s being is determined by their sexual identity: I <i>am</i> a man, a woman, gay, trans, queer, +. Here one may think of Davidson’s notion of “sexistence” or Lipovetsky’s concept of “sex-duction.”
4. Nihilism	There is no transcendental value or meaning beyond the immediate satisfaction of one’s individual needs and preferences.
5. Time	Represented as an arrow, time is conceived as being evolutionary, linear, and infinite in both directions. It is graspable through intuition (immediate perception without any intellectual or rational

	mediation).
6. Space	Three-dimensional, infinite in all directions, eternal and graspable through intuition, this is the space where three-dimensional objects, the only real objects, exist.
7. Matter	Tangible, visible, susceptible of being weighted, matter exists in the form of three-dimensional substances. It cannot deceive us (“knock on wood”) and is what constitutes objects, making them self-enclosed and external to each other ( <i>partes-extra-partes</i> ).
8. Energy	Energy moves the objects invested by it. The most authentic kind of energy is the one that comes from within the anatomical body.
9. Direction	→ (to the right)

Stance of Current Psychoanalytic Theories (including Freudo-Lacaniam).	
1. Individualism	There is no Other; each has their own psychoanalysis. Each of us is responsible for his acts, thoughts, and symptoms. The psychic apparatus is internal. All this embodies a radical individualism.
2. Biologism	A drive ( <i>jouissance</i> for the Freudo-Lacanian) is engendered in, and is a release of, the living substance of the individual biological organism. We are born with them (vitalism).
3. Sexualization of Identity	The one of sex. The event of the body. The singular choosing [of one’s sex]. The oneness of sex. This psychoanalysis sustains the One.
4. Nihilism	For the death-drive, the libido, and <i>jouissance</i> , there are no transcendental meaning or values: it is always about the fulfillment of one’s needs or <i>jouissance</i> —or the lack thereof.
5. Time	It is conceived as evolutive: time leads us from childhood to adulthood and, therefore, maturity (the more mature the better). Maturity is an autonomous and independent state of being: one is born alienated and the goal is to free oneself from that alienation.
6. Space	It is conceived as a bag, as being made of what is external or internal to the body. The internal is one’s own (good ego) and the external opposes the ego. The drives and <i>jouissance</i> are internal.
7. Matter	It is the substance that constitutes us since our birth (our biology). Given what it is (it has an essence), it releases a death-drive, libido, and <i>jouissance</i> in different quantities depending on each individual.
8. Energy	It is the set of our psychic forces (affects), quantified and mixed according to the workings of the anatomical body. They are the vital and death-like forces we are born and live with.

9. Direction	→ (to the right)
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APOLa's Stance	
1. Individualism	We conceive the subject as existing only in a relation of inmixing (a mix that cannot be un-mixed) with Otherness. It speaks ( <i>Ça parle</i> ). The Unconscious is the Other/A's discourse. The sender [of a message] receives their own message in an inverted manner from the receiver. In this logic, the notion of subjective responsibility has no place. We think of the case as an irreducible and co-variant differential set [ <i>conjunto diferencial último y covariante</i> ] within a structure.
2. Biologism	We posit that the drives are the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying. <i>Jouissance</i> is for us, always, <i>jouissance</i> of the Other/A and phallic <i>jouissance</i> (beyond the body). It is impossible that they are originated and localized in the living substance. They are both created by the signifying articulation in the field of the Other/A and they affect the three-dimensional body. There are sensations and needs of the biological body, but they are neither the issue nor the subject of psychoanalysis.
3. Sexualization of Identity	We maintain that the logic of sexualization is that of the <i>héteros</i> as radical difference: being is produced out of non-being. <i>Hétéro</i> -sexuality. Sex is the <i>héteron</i> as radical difference: it creates a multiplicity of values and none of them can consist of being only itself (none of them is One). As it introduces non-being, <i>héteros</i> (or <i>héteron</i> ) opposes identity. Difference produces being from non-being. In Lacan's parlance, sex is <i>héteron</i> : it is grounded in the absence of identity, in the not-all.
4. Nihilism	We maintain a creationist conception (ex-nihilo creation), which, from the signifying articulation in the field of the Other/A and discourse, thinks of the <i>object a</i> as a created, particular (not singular, <i>nota bene</i> ) dimension of value and meaning, entirely articulated to the § condition of the subject.
5. Time	We work with the concept of circular time ("anterior future"). As a consequence, the biological body has no logical or chronological antecedence in relation to the symbolic order. The same applies to the relation between anticipation and retroaction, alienation and separation, $S_1$ and $S_2$ . This conception of time requires the admission of a Big Bang of language and discourse.
6. Space	In the psychoanalytic clinic we work with a "topological" space. We think of it as a bi-dimensional (surface-like) space; within this space,

	the difference between the internal and the external is not always operative. The grounding of this space is the hole: <i>béance</i> (gap), created by the signifying articulation in the field of the Other/A.
7. Matter	We conceive the matter of psychoanalysis as a materialism of language and its terms: it is insubstantial, incorporeal, non-natural, invisible, and intangible. It has logical consistency. We posit it and we work with it as a text both in the sense of being an articulation of signifiers ( $S_1/S_2$ ) and a function of the letter.
8. Energy	In psychoanalysis and in everything pertaining the issues concerning the subject, we substitute biological energy and physical forces by the notion of value (quality), understood as a “political economy,” whose appreciation depends on factors such as those emerged from the discursive link, language [ <i>la lengua</i> ], society, and culture, and on the admission of the existence of aleatory factors in every particular (not singular) history.
9. Direction	← (to the left)

## Articulated Concepts

Freud created a new type of social link and its corresponding “device” [*dispositivo*], which, in those cases where the question about the “reasons” for suffering was raised, allowed him to treat modern western suffering, as originated from individualism, biologization (sexualization of identity), and nihilism.

Contrary to the prevailing psychoanalytic trends, which, in our diagnosis, tend to think of psychoanalysis as a form of illusion, we embrace an *a priori* stance that maintains that there is an analytic act capable of addressing human suffering and that this act has the power to create, not a new person or individual, but a new subject.

As anticipated, what we call “Articulated Concepts” is the section of our Scientific Research Program in Psychoanalysis that present the set of auxiliary hypotheses configuring the supplementary presuppositions of the fundamental concepts. We organize them around the following axes:

- a) On the Other, A, and  $\bar{A}$ ;
- b) On the barred Subject ( $\$$ );
- c) On the object *a* and desire;
- d) On the signifier, the signifying chain, the unconscious, and the gap;
- e) On the body, the drives, *jouissance*, and sex/*héteron*;
- f) On psychoanalysis;



g) On the differences between Freud and Lacan;

h) On the differences between our reading of Lacan and the Freudo-Lacanian's'.

### A. On the Other, A, and $\bar{A}$ .

According to the notion of structure we are working with, subjectivity can only be thought of from the existence of the Other. In other words, there is no subject without Other/A, as they are always in a relation of inmixing.

1. Following Lacanian algebra, we distinguish between Other and A: there is a difference between (i) the historical and embodied Other (the "Other" proper) and (ii) the *locus* or site of the A. The latter indicates the battery, treasure, swarm, and set of signifiers.


2. We distinguish between the father (as genitor) and the Name-of-the-Father (which should not be equated with any person or gender). We also distinguish between the biological mother and the Mother as embodiment of A. At the end of an analysis, the function of the Other/A is established as  $\bar{A}$ .

3. We think of the logic of the constitution of the subject through two operations: alienation and separation. We understand **alienation** as the deadly effect of the signifying pair. Language is the cause of the effects of alienation ( $\bar{A}$ ): neither  $S_1$  nor  $S_2$ . We do not identify alienation with symbiosis, let alone with merging or blending in [*fundirse o confundirse*] with the Other. The logic of alienation is that of the union of sets in set theory. By **separation** we mean the rescue of the deadly effect of the signifier by means of the desire of the historical Other. We identify separation neither with the notion of separating oneself from the Other, nor with that of gaining autonomy in relation to the Other or achieving independence from the Other. Separation means for us the advent of the condition of object *a* for  $\bar{S}$ . The logic of separation is that of intersection of sets in set theory.

4. The Name-of-the-Father is the concept through which we conceive the articulation (not the opposition) of law and desire, and even its very emergence.

### B. On the Barred Subject $\bar{S}$

1. "Subject" is the topic, issue, or subject-matter, emerged in-between two enunciative instances. In this logic, the subject of the unconscious is a creation of the analysand and the analyst, a subject that is supposed to be animated by a desire susceptible of being interpreted. Once it is logically established that there is no subject without Other/A, it is possible to define the notion of subject operated with by psychoanalysis by distinguishing it from any assimilation to a (social) person, a biological individual, a (political) citizen, or any entity of which it is attested that it is identical to itself. Lacan formalizes the split subject, born as the product of the signifying articulation in the form of a loop between  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , as a Moëbius strip cut by its middle line. It is a subject split between knowledge and truth.



2. It is in this sense that we claim that there is no intersubjective relationship: the existence of the subject entails that of at least two signifiers, i.e., a relationship, but there are no two subjects, as there is no dialogue.

3. The topological model that shows the link/bond [*vínculo/lazo*] between  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  is that of two interpenetrated tori.

4. According to this conceptualization of the subject, subjective responsibility is challenged as a psychoanalytic concept, as it contradicts the idea of a non-individual subject. None of this means that we are not aware of the fact that in the psychoanalysis it is fundamental that the commonly-called “unconscious feelings of guilt” are addressed. However, we disagree with the post-Lacanian way of proceeding, which consists of making the subject responsible. We think that this procedure ends up blaming the subject.

5. We propose the notion of a “local subject:” we think that the notion of subject conceived as what a signifier represents for another signifier only operates in analytical practice, i.e., as a consequence of the act of instituting some terms of the text or material of the analytical session as signifiers. We understood the session itself as the inter-textuality constituted by the analysand and the analyst.

### C. On the Object $a$ and Desire

1. There is mourning for the loss of a true, non-metonymical, object.

2. Because the object is not metonymic, there is a true act.

3. Desire is not metonymic; it arises when, through an interpretative act, the signifying chain closes in the form of a loop, creating thereby a hole that allows for the interpretation of the object  $a$  in its particular condition and in relation to the Other/A. Desire is articulated, though it is not entirely and definitively articulable.

4. Repetition, in a psychoanalytic sense, is the repetition of a failure [*falla*] going through three generations, and also the failure in the articulation of law and desire. It is not a structural failure, but a historical one, and this is why our notion of repletion should not be confused with that

other version, prevailing in most psychoanalytic circles, according to which what repeats is the impossibility of finding satisfaction or its object, as the failure we are considering can only be addressed in relation to signifying terms (such as father, mother, son, daughter, grandmother, etc.), i.e., elements in the particular textual plot [*trama*] of a subject.

5. Subject and object *a* are bi-dimensional.

6. Object *a* is the realization (the advent) of the subject.

#### D. On the Signifier, the Signifying Chain, the Unconscious and the Gap (*béance*)

1. The Unconscious is structured as a language.

2. The signifying chain has the structure of a loop (Jordan curve) that enables the reading of the material as “rings of a necklace.”

3. The Unconscious does not conduct the cure; it is the analyst who is responsible for it.

4. In psychoanalysis there is an *a priori*: in the beginning there was the verb, which indicates an event of discourse, not death or action. This is why we dismiss the post-Lacanian idea of a biological body as a pre-existing substratum of an individual subject; such a body is for us an epiphenomenon.

5. The logical antecedent of every subject is the existence of A—the treasure and battery of signifiers and their logic—and of the Other—embodied in someone and articulated, at least, in three generations.

6. We hold a creationist position—*ex-nihilo* creation—and reject evolutionism in psychoanalysis.

7. We do not consider holophrases to be the gluing [*pegoteo*] of two signifiers, but the loss of the function of the closed loop  $S_1/S_2$ .

#### E. On the Drives, the Body, *Jouissance*, and *sex/hétron*

1. The real for psychoanalysis is not the (three-dimensional) biological body, but the impossible. Consequently, the sciences that best guide psychoanalysis to address this notion of real are not biology or classical physics, but logic.

2. We consider drives to be the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying.

3. We reaffirm that, according to Jacques Lacan, *jouissance* is not the satisfaction of a drive, but the manifestation of the signifier’s law of not-all applied to the signifier itself, whose foundation we find in the demonstration of the incompleteness of formal systems (Gödel’s Theorem). Lacan articulates it as  $J(A)$  and  $J(\phi)$ . These are impossible to write in the Freudian system with its conceptualization of the pair satisfaction/dissatisfaction.

5. We refuse to ground psychoanalysis in an energetics model. To analyze the forces that operate in the field of the Subject and the Other/A, we rely on the notion of a “political economy.”

6. We understand that there is no sexual relationship [*il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel*]. This is a consequence of the lack of a third term allowing the relationship to be written as a logical proportion. It is a logical-formal problem that appears in the psychoanalytic clinic and not an issue having to do with the coupling of sexed bodies.

7. As it introduces non-being, *héteros* or *héteron* is opposed to identity. Difference produces being from non-being. In Lacan’s parlance, sex is *héteron*, as grounded in the absence of identity, i.e., in the not-all.<sup>3</sup> Lacan’s stance is well-reflected by the following quotation from *L’étourdit*:

What is called sex [...] is properly, by supporting itself from not-all, the *héteron*, which cannot be staunched by a universe. Let us call heterosexual, by definition, one who loves women, whatever may be his/her own sex. This will be clearer. I said: to love, not: being engaged to them by a relationship that is not there. This is even what the insatiability of love implies, which is explained by this premise. That it should have required the analytic discourse that this might come to be said sufficiently shows that it is not in every discourse that a saying comes to ex-sist. [...] It is the logic of the *héteros* which must be started, the remarkable thing about it being that the Parmenides ends up with it starting from the incompatibility of the One and Being.

For Lacan, then, sexuality is located around the *héteros*, the Other, what “must always be posited,” and what can always be posited in a different way in a discourse that makes that saying ex-ist and challenge the consistency of totalization.

## F. On Psychoanalysis

1. Psychoanalysis does not coincide with phenomenology or with psychology. It requires a mathematized formalization: the *mathème* and topology. At the same time, as its conceptualization goes beyond common sense, it always entails an element of surprise.

2. Resistance to psychoanalysis is the analyst’s.

3. The analyst’s act is through words, interpretation, not silence—unless silence is the best that can be said in a given circumstance.

4. The cut in psychoanalysis coincides with the cure of the symptom and of neurosis, not with the hasty interruption of the analytic session.

5. We attribute great value to the usage of topological surfaces in psychoanalytic theory as models that overcome certain Euclidean conceptions of some particular concepts and fundamental notions in psychoanalysis:

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<sup>3</sup> This idea of Lacan must be put in dialogue with his anti-philosophical and sophistic stance. Cf. the essay by Rosella V. Pusineri and Juliana Zaratiegui, “Más allá de Freud, implicancias de la novedad de Lacan como efecto del lenguaje,” in *Revista El rey está desnudo*, issue 16: [www.elreyestadesnudo.com.ar](http://www.elreyestadesnudo.com.ar)

- The analysand/analyst bond is expressed through the Klein bottle.
- Reality in psychoanalysis is conceived as a Cross-Cap.
- Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real in psychoanalysis only exist as interpenetrated knots in a Borromean form (Brunnian link).
- Desire, demand, and object *a* are written on the surface of two interpenetrated tori.
- The Unconscious is posed as a Moëbius strip (double inscription).

6. We think of phantasy [Sp. *fantasma*; Fr. *fantasme*] as a logical formula that operates as a framework of reality, understanding by the latter a logical impossibility. Phantasy articulates (i) a certain fading of the subject in relation to the desire of object *a* with (ii) a certain condition of object *a* that emerges in the field of the Other/A:  $\S \diamond a$ . From this perspective, phantasy is neither that which keeps sexual arousal active (as in Freud) nor the crystal through which we view the world, as the latter corresponds to Melanie Klein's theory of unconscious fantasy.

7. The analytical device operates as the logical work of interpretation of an adequately formalized text.

8. Sessions should not be short: they should last as long as the interpretation of the material determines and depend on the style of the analyst and the analysand's suffering at stake.

9. Along the lines proposed by Foucault, we consider that the political honor of psychoanalysis lies in being a subversive response to biopolitics.

10. The subject of the unconscious, understood as what a signifier represents to another signifier, is to be created and treated only in the context of the relation between analyst and analysand converting *only certain terms* of the text into signifiers. We always operate with a "local subject."

11. That there was an analyst in the course of an analysis can only be established retroactively as a consequence of the cure of transference neurosis.

12. That the analyst "does not respond" to the analysand's demand does not mean mistreating the analysand, but enabling the beyond-the-demand, i.e., the field of desire.

13. Regarding psychoanalysis with children, we maintain that it is not the case that the subject of this practice has a definite age or lacks development. The idea of a subject-child contradicts our definition of subject. We reject all accounts of the subject based on the categories of evolution and maturity.

## G. On the Differences between Freud and Lacan

1. Freud and Lacan's theories can be neatly distinguished and each operates with opposite conceptions of the cure. In short, we think that, for Freud, psychoanalysis is an attempt to allow

drives to find satisfaction against the background of reality; for Lacan, psychoanalysis is an act through which the subject is created and realized around object *a*.

2. We think that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a field apart from that of the sciences.

3.

Freud		Lacan
<i>Vorstellung</i> [representation]	≠	Signifier
Oedipus Complex	≠	Paternal metaphor
Ego, superego, <i>id</i>	≠	Symbolic, Imaginary, Real
At the beginning there was Death	≠	At the beginning there was the Word
The unconscious as the system of repressed representations	≠	The unconscious as the Other's discourse
A drive is energy, coming from the biological body, that animates the dynamics of the psychic apparatus	≠	A drive is the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying
Sex follows the evolution of libido according to the following sequence: oral → anal → phallic → genital	≠	Sex deploys itself according to the logic of the <i>hétéros/héteron</i>

#### H. On the Differences between Lacan and the Post-Lacanian (Freudo-Lacanian)

1. Freud ≠ Lacan ≠ Miller

2. We do not agree with the “evolutionary” criterion in psychoanalysis, operative, for instance, in the standard segmentation of Lacan’s teaching in different stages. This criterion makes possible the claim—that we reject—that there is a truer, more real, and more Lacanian “latest Lacan.” We also reject the evolutionary model applied to the subject: having born alienated to the Other, one should separate oneself from the Other to find oneself.

3. We think that the notion of structure, mathematized formalization, the *mathème*, and topology are fundamental in the field of psychoanalysis. Without them, it is impossible to formulate some of its fundamental concepts and ideas.

4. The real conceived as the individual’s biological flesh is radically different from the real as logical impossibility.

5. The act conceived as doing something in the three-dimensional scene of reality (holding someone, hitting or spitting on something, etc.) must be clearly distinguished from the signifying cut that creates a new subject (topic, issue, subject-matter).

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